Fiverr International Ltd. (FVRR) valuation at a glance
Fiverr International Ltd. (FVRR) trades below the fair value estimate shown here. At $11.06 versus a $16.50 estimate, that is a 49% upside.
- Price
- $11.06
- Fair value estimate
- $16.50
- Upside
- +49%
- Forward P/E
- 5.3×
- Market cap
- $398M
- P/S (TTM)
- 0.9×
CompaniesFVRR
Overview
FVRR
Fiverr International Ltd.
Communication ServicesMarketplaceFreelanceAI DisruptionNet CashBuybackDeep Value
$11.06+5.7%
Market Cap
$398M
SEC Form 20-F (FY2025, filed Mar 12 2026) via yfinance. Israeli foreign private issuer, so 20-F and 6-K rather than 10-K/10-Q.
P/E (TTM)
13.8×
via financials
Rev Growth YoY
10.1%
+10.1%SEC filing
Gross Margin
81.9%
SEC filing
FCF Yield
24.4%
calculated
Upside to FV
+49.2%
vs fair value
Conviction
3/5A debt-free freelance marketplace with $269.4M of net cash against a $397.6M market cap, so the operating business carries an enterprise value of just $128.2M against $96.9M of trailing free cash flow, about 1.3x. It earns 82% gross margins, turned GAAP profitable, and extinguished $459.0M of convertible debt in a year. The catch is that marketplace GMV FELL 2.2% and active buyers fell 13.6% in FY2025; the 10.1% revenue growth came from services revenue and take rate, not volume. Management says AI is simultaneously creating demand for complex work and destroying it for simple work.
Research Depth
ScreeningDeep ResearchFull Model
Updated 1d ago
Quality Snowflake
Overall 73/100
Value5/5
Future2/3
Past3/3
Health4/4
Dividend0/1
Each axis scores the checks for which data is available (filled = pass, hollow = no data). Computed from the sourced metrics on this page, not a third-party rating.
Thesis
Fiverr is priced as though its marketplace is ending, and the balance sheet means you barely have to pay for the marketplace at all. At $11.06 the market capitalization is $397.6M, of which $269.4M is net cash, so the enterprise value of the operating business is about $128.2M. That business produced $96.9M of trailing free cash flow and $103.3M in fiscal 2025, which puts the enterprise value at roughly 1.3 times free cash flow. Gross margin is 81.9%, the company turned GAAP profitable with net income of $21.0M in FY2025, and it repaid $460.0M of convertible notes in cash at maturity, taking total borrowings from $463.2M to $4.2M in a single year without issuing shares to do it while also repurchasing $32.5M of stock and cutting stock-based compensation from $73.9M to $51.4M. Now the part that explains the price. Revenue rose 10.1% to $430.9M, but marketplace gross merchandise value FELL 2.2% to $1,073.0M and annual active buyers fell 13.6%. Revenue grew because annual spend per buyer rose 13.3% to $342, the take rate ticked up to 27.7%, and services revenue, which is subscriptions and advertising rather than transaction commissions, reached $133.4M or about 31% of the total. So the marketplace itself is contracting while the monetization of what remains improves. Management is explicit about why, and refreshingly two-sided: AI has created new service categories and expanded demand for high-skilled complex work, while the spread of AI tools has created headwinds for simple, low-skilled work, alongside continued weakness in small-business sentiment and hiring. Buyers spending over $500 now account for 66% of marketplace revenue. That is the whole investment question in one line. If Fiverr is shedding low-value buyers whose work AI can do and keeping high-value buyers whose work it cannot, the shrinking buyer count is a mix improvement and the cash flow is durable. If AI keeps climbing the complexity curve, the buyer count keeps falling and spend per buyer eventually follows.
Bull Case
Balance SheetNet cash of $269.4M is 67.8% of the entire market capitalization, and total debt is $4.2M. The company REPAID $460.0M of convertible notes in cash at maturity in FY2025, funded largely by $352.2M of marketable-security maturities, taking total debt from $463.2M to $4.2M. Repaid, not converted, so it cost cash rather than shares. Buying the stock at $11.06 means paying about $128.2M of enterprise value for a business that generated $103.3M of free cash flow last year.
Cash ConversionFree cash flow was $27.7M, $82.1M, $80.6M and $103.3M across FY2022 to FY2025, rising while GAAP results were still catching up. Trailing free cash flow of $96.9M is roughly 4.9 times net income of $21.0M, mostly because stock-based compensation is non-cash, and capital expenditure is trivial at $1.3M a year on an asset-light marketplace with 528 employees.
Not Float-DrivenThe obvious objection to a marketplace with strong cash flow is that it is just holding sellers' money longer. The cash flow statement refutes it here. In FY2025 the user funds line was a $6.5M outflow and the user accounts line a $7.8M inflow, a net working-capital contribution of about $1.2M against $104.6M of operating cash flow, roughly 1%. The cash is coming from the business, not from stretching seller payouts.
Mix ImprovingAnnual spend per buyer rose 13.3% to $342 and buyers spending over $500 grew to 66% of marketplace revenue from 65%. Services revenue, from Seller Plus subscriptions, AutoDS and advertising, reached $133.4M or about 31% of total revenue. Take rate edged up to 27.7%. The monetization of the remaining base is strengthening even as the base shrinks.
Cost DisciplineStock-based compensation fell 30.4% from $73.9M to $51.4M while research and development held flat near $90M. GAAP operating income improved from a $46.9M loss in FY2022 to roughly breakeven at a $1.2M loss in FY2025, and EBITDA went from negative $51.8M to positive $40.2M over the same span. The operating leverage is arriving without cutting the product budget.
Capital ReturnThe company repurchased $100.1M of stock in FY2024 and $32.5M in FY2025, $132.6M across two years against a market capitalization now under $400M. With net cash at two-thirds of the market value and no debt to service, the optionality to keep shrinking the share count is unusually unconstrained.
Bear Case
Marketplace ShrinkingThis is the number that matters. Marketplace GMV fell 2.2% to $1,073.0M in FY2025 and annual active buyers fell 13.6% to about 3.1 million. Revenue grew only because spend per buyer and take rate rose. A marketplace losing buyers at a double-digit rate is losing the network effect that justifies its existence, and no amount of monetization fixes that if it continues.
AI On The CoreManagement states directly that AI adoption has created headwinds for simple and low-skilled services on the marketplace. Writing, translation, basic design and simple code are exactly what large language models now do adequately and nearly free. The bull case requires AI to stop climbing the complexity curve at precisely the point where Fiverr's remaining work begins, and there is no evidence it will.
Revenue QualityThe 10.1% revenue growth is not marketplace growth. Services revenue, at $133.4M or 31% of the total, is subscriptions and advertising sold largely to SELLERS rather than commissions on buyer demand. Advertising revenue taken from freelancers competing for a shrinking pool of buyers is a harder business to grow indefinitely, and it can mask underlying volume decline for several periods.
Disclosure LimitsAs an Israeli foreign private issuer Fiverr files a 20-F and 6-Ks rather than 10-Ks and 10-Qs, and its insiders do not file Form 4. That means no quarterly US-style detail and no visibility into insider buying or selling of the kind available on a domestic filer. Only seven analysts publish estimates. Less scrutiny, less signal.
Cash Is Not All YoursThe balance sheet carries $159.8M of user funds as an asset, which is seller money in transit, matched by $149.5M of user accounts as a liability. They largely offset, but any analysis that counts user funds as corporate cash overstates the position. Corporate liquidity excluding them is cash of $125.2M plus $117.7M of marketable securities plus $40.0M of deposits.
Key Metrics
Market Cap
$398M
SEC Form 20-F (FY2025, filed Mar 12 2026) via yfinance. Israeli foreign private issuer, so 20-F and 6-K rather than 10-K/10-Q.
Enterprise Value
$128M
calculated
Revenue (TTM)
$429M
SEC filing
P/E (TTM)
13.8×
via financials
Forward P/E
5.3×
consensus
P/S (TTM)
0.9×
via financials
P/B
0.9×
via financials
EV/EBITDA
4.9×
calculated
PEG
–
calculated
Revenue Growth
10.1%
SEC filing
Gross Margin
81.9%
SEC filing
Operating Margin
–
SEC filing
Net Margin
6.7%
SEC filing
Free Cash Flow
$97M
SEC filing
FCF Yield
24.4%
calculated
Debt / Equity
0.0×
SEC filing
Current Ratio
1.9×
SEC filing
Short Interest
10.3%
exchange
Institutional Own.
–
13F
Insider Own.
12.5%
proxy
Shares Out.
36.0M
SEC filing
Float
30.6M
exchange
Valuation
Price vs Fair Value
Bear$7.50
Base$16.50
Bull$27.00
Now $11.06
Bear Case
$7.50
Active-buyer decline persists into the mid teens, spend per buyer stops offsetting it, and GMV falls at a mid-single-digit rate. Free cash flow compresses toward $60M as services revenue growth stalls with the seller base. The market pays about 2x that for a shrinking marketplace, roughly $120M of enterprise value, plus net cash of about $250M after continued buybacks, so around $270M of equity on about 34M shares, near $7.90. Call it $7.50 with further buyer erosion. Below the published analyst low of $13.00. Probability ~30%.
Base Case
$16.50
The mix shift works: low-value buyers keep leaving, spend per buyer keeps rising, and GMV stabilizes while services revenue grows. Free cash flow holds near $95M. The market pays about 4x free cash flow for the operating business, roughly $380M of enterprise value, plus about $260M of net cash, giving roughly $640M of equity across about 35M shares, close to $18, tempered to $16.50 for execution risk. Near the $16.57 analyst mean and above the $15.00 median. Probability ~45%.
Bull Case
$27.00
The transformation announced in late 2025 reaccelerates GMV, AI-related categories more than replace the simple work being lost, and the market re-rates a debt-free, cash-generative marketplace to about 8x free cash flow of $100M. That is $800M of enterprise value plus roughly $250M of net cash after buybacks, about $1.05B of equity on 34M shares, near $30, tempered to $27. Roughly the $26.00 analyst high and still far below the $28.00 fifty-two-week high. Probability ~25%.
DCF Summary
DCF awaiting Phase 2+
Discounted cash-flow model is built once research reaches the deep-research stage.
Historical Multiples
| Year | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY22 | – | 1.5× | – |
| FY23 | – | 3.1× | – |
| FY24 | 24.6× | 1.1× | – |
| FY25 | 19.0× | 0.9× | 4.9× |
| TTM · | 13.8× | 0.9× | 4.9× |
Current multiple highlighted vs trailing history.
Peer Comparison
| Ticker | Mkt Cap | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA | Rev Growth | Gross Mgn | Net Mgn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FVRR | $0.40B | 13.8× | 0.9× | 4.9× | +10.1% | 81.9% | 6.7% |
| UPWK | $1.14B | 10.9× | 1.4× | 6.7× | +1.4% | 77.5% | 13.8% |
| ETSY | $7.96B | 30.8× | 2.7× | 21.9× | +3.1% | 71.6% | 9.8% |
| GTM | $0.91B | 7.2× | 0.7× | 7.2× | +2.9% | 83.8% | 10.1% |
| CNXC | $1.50B | – | 0.1× | 5.0× | +2.2% | 34.0% | -13.2% |
Financials
| Line Item | FY2024 | FY2025 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue Marketplace $297.5M + services $133.4M. Services is about 31% of revenue. | $391.5M | $430.9M | +10.1% |
| Cost of Revenue | $70.6M | $79.4M | +12.5% |
| Gross Profit Gross margin about 82% | $320.9M | $351.5M | +9.5% |
| Research & Development Held flat while other costs fell | $90.2M | $90.7M | +0.6% |
| Operating Income (Loss) GAAP. Improving from a $46.9M loss in FY2022 toward breakeven. | ($15.8M) | ($1.2M) | – |
| Net Income | $18.2M | $21.0M | +15.4% |
| EBITDA | $24.9M | $40.2M | +61.4% |
| Diluted Average Shares | 37.8M | 37.2M | -1.6% |
| Item | FY2025 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $125.2M | $133.5M |
| Marketable Securities (current) | $117.7M | $288.9M |
| Short-term Bank Deposits | $40.0M | $144.8M |
| User Funds (asset) Seller money in transit. Offset by user accounts below. NOT company cash. | $159.8M | $153.3M |
| User Accounts (liability) The matching obligation | $149.5M | $141.7M |
| Convertible Notes Fully extinguished during FY2025 | $0.0M | $457.9M |
| Total Debt A $459.0M reduction in one year | $4.2M | $463.2M |
| Total Assets | $684.6M | $1,070.0M |
| Shareholders' Equity | $412.0M | $362.6M |
| Component | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $83.2M | $83.1M | $104.6M |
| Capital Expenditure Asset-light: capex is under 1% of revenue | ($1.1M) | ($2.5M) | ($1.3M) |
| Free Cash Flow Against an enterprise value of about $128.2M, so roughly 1.2x on FY2025 | $82.1M | $80.6M | $103.3M |
| Share Repurchases $132.6M across two years | $0.0M | ($100.1M) | ($32.5M) |
| Stock-Based Compensation Down 30.4% year over year, and the main bridge between net income and free cash flow | $68.7M | $73.9M | $51.4M |
Source: SEC Form 20-F for fiscal 2025, filed March 12 2026, figures via yfinance in USD. Fiverr is an Israeli foreign private issuer, so it files Form 20-F annually and Form 6-K for interim reports rather than 10-K and 10-Q, and its insiders do not file Form 4. One balance-sheet subtlety matters more than any ratio here: the 20-F carries $159.8M of user funds as an asset and $149.5M of user accounts as a liability. That is seller money held in transit, it largely offsets, and it must not be counted as corporate cash. Corporate liquidity excluding it is $125.2M of cash, $117.7M of marketable securities and $40.0M of short-term deposits. Operating margin is not published as a headline metric because FY2025 GAAP operating income was a small loss while the trailing figure is slightly positive.
Catalysts
Q3 '26
Earningshigh relevance
Next 6-K interim results
As a foreign private issuer Fiverr reports via 6-K rather than 10-Q. The three numbers that decide the thesis are annual active buyers against the 13.6% decline, annual spend per buyer against $342, and marketplace GMV against $1,073.0M. If buyers stabilize while spend per buyer holds, the mix-shift argument is working. If spend per buyer stalls while buyers keep falling, it is not.
2026-27
Strategyhigh relevance
The four-pillar transformation
In late 2025 management began a transformation around matching infrastructure, product experience, go-to-market execution and operational excellence, explicitly aimed at leaning into high-skilled complex services and reaccelerating growth. Watch for disclosed evidence that AI-related categories are growing faster than simple categories are shrinking.
2026-27
Capital Return
Buyback pace against a net-cash balance sheet
The company bought back $100.1M in FY2024 and $32.5M in FY2025 with no debt to service and net cash at 67.8% of the market capitalization. At around $11 a share, continued repurchase is unusually accretive. A step-up in pace would signal management agrees the stock is mispriced; a pause would suggest they see the cash as needed.
2026-27
Product
Services revenue mix
Services revenue reached $133.4M, about 31% of total, from Seller Plus subscriptions, AutoDS and advertising. It is the engine offsetting marketplace contraction. Watch whether it keeps growing as the seller base adjusts, since advertising sold to freelancers competing for a shrinking buyer pool has a natural ceiling.
2026-27
Macro
Small-business hiring sentiment
Management attributes part of the contraction to continued weakness in SMB sentiment and hiring demand, separate from AI. That is cyclical rather than structural, so a recovery in small-business hiring would lift active buyers independently of the AI question and would help separate the two effects.
Ongoing
Geopolitical
Israel domicile
Fiverr is headquartered in Israel, which brings currency exposure, regional security risk and Israeli tax treatment into the picture. These are standing risk factors in the 20-F rather than dated events, but they are part of why an otherwise clean balance sheet trades at this multiple.
Risks
| Risk | Category | Severity | Probability | Impact on Thesis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marketplace GMV fell 2.2% to $1,073.0M in FY2025 and annual active buyers fell 13.6%, so the reported 10.1% revenue growth came from spend per buyer, take rate and services revenue rather than from marketplace volume. | Business Model | High | Certain | A marketplace that loses buyers at a double-digit rate is eroding the network effect that is its only durable moat. Monetizing the remainder harder can offset it for several periods, which is exactly what happened in FY2025, but it cannot offset it indefinitely. |
| Management states that AI adoption has created headwinds for simple and low-skilled services on the marketplace, which is a large share of what a freelance marketplace historically sold. | Disruption | High | High | Writing, translation, basic design and simple code are now done adequately and nearly free by general-purpose models. The bull case needs automation to stop advancing where Fiverr's remaining work begins. Nothing in the filings guarantees that, and the company itself frames the effect as two-sided rather than benign. |
| Revenue quality is shifting toward services sold to sellers, at $133.4M or about 31% of revenue, including advertising bought by freelancers competing for a shrinking pool of buyers. | Revenue Quality | Medium | High | Seller-funded revenue can grow for a time even as buyer demand falls, which masks the underlying trend. If the seller base contracts alongside the buyer base, this line reverses quickly and the offset to marketplace decline disappears. |
| As an Israeli foreign private issuer Fiverr files 20-F and 6-K rather than 10-K and 10-Q, its insiders do not file Form 4, and only seven analysts publish estimates. | Disclosure | Medium | Certain | There is no quarterly US-style detail and no insider-transaction visibility, so a key signal available on domestic filers is simply absent here. Thin coverage also means less independent scrutiny of the operating metrics that the whole thesis turns on. |
| Israel domicile brings currency, tax and regional security exposure that sit outside management's control. | Geopolitical | Medium | Medium | These are standing 20-F risk factors rather than dated events. For a company whose engineering base and headquarters are concentrated in one country, disruption there is an operational risk that a globally distributed competitor would not carry. |
Technical Snapshot
52-Week Range
$9.58$11.06$28.00
RSI (14)
52.8
neutral
50-Day MA
$10.65
+3.8%above
200-Day MA
$14.78
-25.2%below
Avg Vol (30d)
0.8M
-38%vs average
Support Levels
$10.15$10.11$9.67
Resistance Levels
$11.57$13.23$20.35
Price path reconstructed from the 52-week range, current price, and 50/200-day moving averages. Connect a live market-data feed for production.
Ownership & Insider Activity
Top Institutional Holders via 13F filings
13F holdings pending
Institutional holder detail awaiting filing.
Insider Activity
Insiders are reported at about 12.5% of a 36.0M share count, against a float of 30.6M and short interest of 10.3% of that float. Beyond that the ownership picture is genuinely thinner than for a US domestic filer, and the page does not pretend otherwise. As an Israeli foreign private issuer Fiverr's officers and directors do not file Form 4, so the open-market insider buying and selling that anchors the ownership section on other names here simply does not exist as a public record. Institutional positions are visible only through 13F filings by US managers, and the yfinance institutional-ownership field is unreliable across this dataset so it is not published. What the balance sheet does say about ownership economics is more useful: the company repurchased $100.1M of stock in FY2024 and $32.5M in FY2025, $132.6M across two years against a market capitalization now below $400M, funded entirely from internal cash while simultaneously extinguishing $459.0M of convertible debt. Diluted average shares fell from 39.2M in FY2023 to 37.2M in FY2025 even as stock-based compensation ran at $51M to $74M a year, so the buyback has been outpacing dilution.
No open-market insider transactions
None reported in the recent Form 4 window.
Peer Comparison
| Ticker | Mkt Cap | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA | Rev Growth | Gross Mgn | Net Mgn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FVRR | $0.40B | 13.8× | 0.9× | 4.9× | +10.1% | 81.9% | 6.7% |
| UPWK | $1.14B | 10.9× | 1.4× | 6.7× | +1.4% | 77.5% | 13.8% |
| ETSY | $7.96B | 30.8× | 2.7× | 21.9× | +3.1% | 71.6% | 9.8% |
| GTM | $0.91B | 7.2× | 0.7× | 7.2× | +2.9% | 83.8% | 10.1% |
| CNXC | $1.50B | – | 0.1× | 5.0× | +2.2% | 34.0% | -13.2% |
Recognizable sector comparables. Multiples are trailing-twelve-month figures from market and exchange data; lowest multiple in each column highlighted. Loss-making peers show no P/E.
Research Notes
2026-07-28Internal (40-agent DeepSeek pass + yfinance ground truth + 20-F verification)
DEEP INTEL: FVRR, paying 1.3x cash flow for the business and getting the cash for free
Built from a 40-agent qualitative pass run through the 100x pipeline for about a cent, with every number then verified against the FY2025 20-F and a yfinance harvest. The model contributed no figures by design. Its most valuable contribution was flagging that a marketplace holds seller money on its balance sheet, which sent me to check the user funds line and confirm it must not be counted as corporate cash. Setup: $269.4M net cash on a $397.6M market cap, so $128.2M of enterprise value against $96.9M of trailing free cash flow, offset by a marketplace whose GMV and buyer count are both falling. Conviction 3/5.
2026-03-12Fiverr FY2025 Form 20-F
The number the revenue line hides
Revenue rose 10.1% to $430.9M in fiscal 2025, which reads like growth. The marketplace underneath it shrank. Marketplace GMV was $1,073.0M, down 2.2% year over year, and the 20-F attributes that to a 13.6% decline in annual active buyers partially offset by a 13.3% increase in annual spend per buyer, which reached $342 from $302. The take rate rose slightly to 27.7% from 27.6% on fee-structure adjustments. Revenue split $297.5M marketplace and $133.4M services, the latter about 31% of the total and consisting of Seller Plus subscriptions, the AutoDS e-commerce tool and advertising. So growth came from monetizing a smaller base harder, plus a services line sold largely to sellers. Buyers spending over $500 rose to 66% of marketplace revenue from 65%, which is the mix-improvement evidence the bull case rests on. The active buyer base is about 3.1 million across more than 160 countries.
2026-03-12Fiverr FY2025 Form 20-F
Management's own account of AI, which cuts both ways
The 20-F does not hide behind boilerplate. It states that AI has created many new AI-related service categories and significantly expanded customers' needs for high-skilled and complex services, and that on the other hand the adoption of AI tools in the broader market has created headwinds for simple and low-skilled services on the marketplace. It adds continued weakness in small-business sentiment and hiring demand as a separate cause, and concludes that together these resulted in contraction in marketplace GMV and active buyers during 2025. In late 2025 the company began a transformation built on four pillars: upgrades to matching infrastructure, product experience, go-to-market execution and operational excellence, aimed at leaning into high-skilled complex work. Two effects are running at once and the filings do not yet let an outsider separate the cyclical SMB weakness from the structural AI effect.
2026-03-12Fiverr FY2025 Form 20-F, consolidated balance sheets
User funds are not company cash
This is the trap on any marketplace balance sheet and it is worth stating plainly. At December 31 2025 Fiverr carried user funds of $159,849 thousand as a current asset and user accounts of $149,454 thousand as a current liability. That is money belonging to sellers, held in transit between buyer payment and seller withdrawal. The two largely offset, leaving a net position of about $10.4M, and neither belongs in a net-cash calculation for equity holders. Corporate liquidity excluding user funds is cash and equivalents of $125,215 thousand, current marketable securities of $117,705 thousand and short-term bank deposits of $40,000 thousand. Against total debt of roughly $4.2M that is the basis for describing the company as net cash. The distinction matters because counting user funds would overstate the position by more than a third.
2026-03-12Fiverr FY2025 Form 20-F
The debt that disappeared
The most striking year-over-year change on the balance sheet is the convertible notes line, which went from $457,860 thousand at December 31 2024 to zero at December 31 2025. Total debt fell from $463.2M to $4.2M, a $459.0M reduction in twelve months. Total assets fell correspondingly from $1,070.0M to $684.6M and total liabilities from $707.3M to $272.6M as the associated cash and securities were used. The company did this while also repurchasing $32.5M of its own stock and generating record free cash flow of $103.3M. Shareholders' equity rose from $362.6M to $412.0M. Whatever happens to the marketplace, the capital structure risk that would normally accompany a declining business has been removed.
2026-03-12Fiverr FY2025 Form 20-F, consolidated statements of cash flows
Testing the seller-float objection
A 40-agent adversarial pass raised the standard challenge to any marketplace with strong cash generation: that free cash flow is really just seller money held longer, and would reverse if payout terms tightened. The cash flow statement settles it. In fiscal 2025 the change in user funds was a $6,540 thousand outflow and the change in user accounts a $7,763 thousand inflow, a net working-capital contribution of about $1,223 thousand against net cash provided by operating activities of $104,589 thousand. That is roughly 1%. The cash is coming from the business rather than from stretching freelancer payouts. Two other lines are worth noting from the same statement. Share-based compensation of $51,389 thousand is the single largest non-cash add-back and the main bridge between net income of $20,983 thousand and operating cash flow, and a revaluation of earn-outs added a further $15,558 thousand, up from $3,202 thousand, which is a non-cash charge worth watching if acquisitions continue.
2026-07-28yfinance (computed, USD)
What the market is actually paying for
At $11.06 the market capitalization is $397.6M and net cash is $269.4M, which is 67.8% of it. Enterprise value is therefore about $128.2M. Trailing free cash flow is $96.9M and fiscal 2025 free cash flow was $103.3M, so the market is paying roughly 1.2 to 1.3 times annual free cash flow for the operating business. Trailing P/E is 13.8 and forward P/E is 5.29 on a business with 81.9% gross margins and 528 employees, which works out near $816,000 of revenue per employee. The shares are 60.5% below the $28.00 fifty-two-week high and the 200-day moving average sits at $14.78. Seven analysts publish targets with a mean of $16.57, a median of $15.00, a low of $13.00 and a high of $26.00, so the whole published range sits above the current price, which is unusual and reflects how thin the coverage is.
Fiverr International Ltd. valuation questions
Is Fiverr International Ltd. (FVRR) stock undervalued?
Against the fair value estimate shown on this page, Fiverr International Ltd. trades below: $11.06 today versus a $16.50 estimate, about +49%. The methodology and per-scenario sources are set out in the Valuation section. Treat it as research, not advice, and do your own homework.
What is Fiverr International Ltd.'s fair value?
The fair value estimate shown for FVRR is $16.50. Its valuation scenarios span bear $7.50, base $16.50, bull $27.00. See the Valuation section for the basis of each.
What is Fiverr International Ltd.'s forward P/E ratio?
Fiverr International Ltd. (FVRR) trades at a forward P/E of 5.3×, and 0.9× trailing sales.
What is Fiverr International Ltd.'s market cap?
Fiverr International Ltd. (FVRR) has a market capitalization (its market value, often searched as "net worth") of $398M, and an enterprise value of $128M.
What is the bull and bear case for FVRR?
Valuation scenarios: bull $27.00, base $16.50, bear $7.50. Each reflects a distinct set of assumptions; the drivers and sources are detailed in the Valuation section above.