ZoomInfo (GTM) valuation at a glance
ZoomInfo (GTM) trades below the fair value estimate shown here. At $3.08 versus a $5.00 estimate, that is a 62% upside.
- Price
- $3.08
- Fair value estimate
- $5.00
- Upside
- +62%
- Forward P/E
- 2.8×
- Market cap
- $908M
- P/S (TTM)
- 0.7×
CompaniesGTM
Overview
GTM
ZoomInfo Technologies Inc.
TechnologyB2B DataGo-To-Market SoftwareAI DisruptionAI VendorBuybackFree Cash FlowDeep Value
$3.08+5.5%
Market Cap
$908M
SEC 10-K (FY2025, filed Feb 12 2026) + 10-Q/8-K (Q1 2026, filed May 11 2026) via yfinance
P/E (TTM)
7.2×
via financials
Rev Growth YoY
2.9%
+2.9%SEC filing
Gross Margin
83.8%
SEC filing
FCF Yield
41.1%
calculated
Upside to FV
+62.3%
vs fair value
Conviction
3/584%-gross-margin B2B data platform at 2.8x company-guided forward earnings and a 41% free-cash-flow yield ($373M TTM on a $908M market cap), down 75% from its 52-week high after management cut FY2026 revenue guidance by ~$62M on May 11 2026, cut 20% of staff and announced a hybrid consumption pricing model for rollout from Q3 2026. Net revenue retention is 90%, so the installed base still shrinks. Offsetting that, the board has authorized $2.6B of buybacks with $1,140.1M still available, more than the market cap, and retired 27% of the shares since 2022, guided FY2026 adjusted EPS was left UNCHANGED at $1.10-1.12, and the company's own AI line (Copilot, GTM Studio, the MCP-based GTM.AI layer) is now over 20% of ACV.
Research Depth
ScreeningDeep ResearchFull Model
Updated 1d ago
Quality Snowflake
Overall 58/100
Value5/5
Future2/3
Past4/4
Health1/4
Dividend0/1
Each axis scores the checks for which data is available (filled = pass, hollow = no data). Computed from the sourced metrics on this page, not a third-party rating.
Thesis
ZoomInfo sells the B2B contact-and-company database that sales teams prospect from, and it is priced as though that business is ending. At $3.08 the market cap is $908M against $373.1M of trailing free cash flow, a 41% yield, on 83.8% gross margins and $126.7M of GAAP net income. The company's own FY2026 guidance is for $400-420M of unlevered free cash flow and $1.10-1.12 of adjusted EPS, which puts the stock at roughly 2.8x guided earnings. The de-rating is not mysterious. On May 11, 2026 ZoomInfo beat its own quarter (revenue $310.2M, +1.5%; adjusted EPS $0.28 against its own guide of $0.25-0.27) and then cut full-year revenue guidance from $1.247-1.267B to $1.185-1.205B, a roughly $62M reduction that implies a mid-single-digit revenue DECLINE for 2026. Alongside it the board approved a ~600-person reduction in force, about 20% of first-quarter headcount, including closing the Israel site entirely, and management described an industry shift toward consumption-based pricing. The stock fell 33% the next day and has since made new lows at $2.54. The operating problem is visible in one disclosed number: net revenue retention was 90% at both December 2025 and March 2026, up from 87% a year earlier but still below 100%, meaning the existing customer base contracts every year and has to be replaced by new logos. Customers paying $100,000 or more fell by 21 sequentially to 1,900. The bear case writes itself, that large language models let buyers assemble contact data themselves and a subscription database becomes a commodity, and a securities class action filed over the November 2025 to May 2026 period alleges management concealed exactly that. Against it sits a genuine capital-return machine: $2.6B of cumulative buyback authorization with $1,140.1M unspent at March 31 2026, $1,376.8M already repurchased across FY2023-FY2025, a share count down from 404.1M to 294.7M, and an adjusted-EPS guide that was NOT cut despite the revenue cut because cost actions and shrinking share count absorbed it. The balance sheet is the constraint rather than the crisis: $1,332.2M of debt principal against $175.9M of cash, with only $5.9M a year amortizing before the 2029 notes wall, but goodwill of $1,692.7M that now exceeds stockholders' equity of $1,508.7M. Melting ice cube or cash machine. The market has already voted for the ice cube.
Bull Case
Cash YieldTrailing free cash flow of $373.1M against a $908M market cap is a 41% equity yield. The company separately guides FY2026 unlevered free cash flow to $400-420M, which is not the same measure: unlevered adds back cash interest and cash taxes, and ran $29.1M above levered free cash flow in Q1 2026 alone. Operating cash flow has held at $417M, $434.9M, $369.4M and $465.4M across FY2022-FY2025, so the cash profile is durable rather than a one-off.
Share ShrinkageIn February 2026 the board added $1.0B to the repurchase program, taking cumulative authorizations to $2.6B as of March 31 2026 with $1,140.1M still available. That remaining authorization exceeds the entire $908M market cap. ZoomInfo spent $400.1M, $565.6M and $411.1M in FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025, then $90.5M in Q1 2026 for 13.1M shares at $6.91. Shares outstanding fell from 404.1M (FY2022) to 294.7M now, a 27% reduction, and every dollar spent at $3.08 retires more than twice the stock a dollar bought in Q1.
EPS Guide HeldThe May 11 2026 revenue cut did not move adjusted EPS guidance, which stayed at $1.10-1.12 for FY2026. Be precise about why. Adjusted operating income guidance WAS cut, from $456-466M to $437-447M, and the EPS line held because the weighted-average share guide fell from 325M to 315M. So the buyback, not the operations, absorbed the miss. At $3.08 that is about 2.8x guided adjusted EPS, a non-GAAP figure that excludes litigation settlement charges.
Cost ResetThe 2026 Restructuring Program approved May 5 2026 cuts roughly 600 roles, about 20% of Q1 headcount, for a one-time pre-tax charge of $45-60M and an expected reduction in annual run-rate operating expense of approximately $60M. About one-quarter of impacted roles are being reallocated to lower-cost locations rather than eliminated.
Franchise QualityGross margin is 84% on a fiscal-year basis and GAAP operating margin 18.6%, with over 35,000 customers and 75% of annual contract value now upmarket, where ACV still grew 5% year over year. ZoomInfo was named a Leader in the Forrester Wave for B2B marketing and sales data providers in Q1 2026 with the highest current-offering score among evaluated vendors.
AI Product LineThe company is an AI vendor, not only an AI target. Copilot passed $150M of ACV by the Q4 2024 call and management said on the Q4 2025 call that it exceeded 20% of total ACV having more than doubled during 2025, with Copilot cohorts renewing mid-single digits better than legacy SalesOS. GTM Studio was in hands-on trial with more than a quarter of existing customers at Q1 2026, and its revenue is excluded from FY2026 guidance while its costs are already in the numbers. On June 1 2026 GTM.AI went generally available as a Model Context Protocol layer that sells the data into Claude, ChatGPT and Copilot rather than through a ZoomInfo seat.
Bear Case
Shrinking BaseNet revenue retention was 90% at both December 31 2025 and March 31 2026, against 87% a year earlier. Below 100% means the existing book contracts every year before any new business is written, and it has been below 100% for at least three years. Customers with $100,000 or more in annual contract value fell 21 sequentially to 1,900, though they are up 32 year over year and the cohort peaked higher at 1,926 back in December 2022. Revenue is guided to DECLINE in 2026.
AI DisruptionThe core bear argument is that generative AI collapses the value of a licensed contact database, since buyers can assemble and enrich lists themselves or through AI-native tools. On the Q1 2026 call CEO Henry Schuck described 'a trend of AI and agentic confusion in our customer conversations, what can be built versus bought,' which 'led to a pause in purchasing decisions.' Management frames that as build-versus-buy indecision it expects to win, alongside macro uncertainty, not as a verdict against the data. The counterweight to the seat-erosion story is that roughly a third of ACV is already untethered from seats, with management targeting about half within 18 to 24 months.
LitigationTwo securities class actions, not one, and the older is well advanced. State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio v. ZoomInfo, No. 3:24-cv-05739-TMC (W.D. Wash.), filed September 4 2024, SURVIVED a motion to dismiss on October 28 2025 as to ZoomInfo, Schuck, Hyzer and Hays, and class-certification briefing opened June 26 2026. Tejada v. ZoomInfo, No. 3:26-cv-05696 (W.D. Wash.), filed June 25 2026, covers November 3 2025 to May 11 2026, alleging concealment of slowing seat-based demand and weakening upsells, with a lead-plaintiff deadline of August 24 2026. Three derivative suits and four non-securities matters are also live. ZoomInfo has paid before: $30.1M of charges in FY2024 settled right-of-publicity claims.
Regulated DeletionThe second erosion channel, and the one nobody models. ZoomInfo is a registered California data broker, and from August 1 2026 the Delete Act requires brokers to poll the state's central deletion platform at least every 45 days, honour verified deletion requests within 45 days, treat unverified ones as opt-outs, push deletions to service providers, and keep deleting the same consumers' data as it is recollected. AI attacks demand for the database; this attacks the database itself, permanently and on a statutory clock. ZoomInfo also relies on Standard Contractual Clauses rather than the Data Privacy Framework for the 12% of revenue booked outside the US, and it has already paid $30.1M to settle right-of-publicity claims. Request volume is not yet published, so the size is genuinely unknown.
Goodwill vs EquityGoodwill has sat at $1,692.7M since FY2022 and now EXCEEDS stockholders' equity of $1,508.7M. With the shares down roughly 75% in a year, market capitalization is far below book carrying value, which is precisely the trigger condition for an impairment test. An impairment would be non-cash but large.
LeverageDebt principal of $1,332.2M against $175.9M of cash, and 51% of that stack floats: the term loan at SOFR plus 1.75% (5.71% effective) and the revolver at SOFR plus 2.10% (6.12%), with only the $650M of notes fixed at 3.875%. The rate reset has already started. A $500M swap fixed at 0.370% matured January 30 2026 and was replaced with $425M at 3.280%, which is why Q1 2026 net interest expense jumped 38% to $13.5M, an annualised run rate near $54M against the $42.6M booked for all of FY2025. Larger still, and absent from most summaries, is the $2,731.9M tax receivable agreement liability owed to pre-IPO owners, more than double the funded debt and 55% of total liabilities. It is real cash, $23.6M paid in FY2025 and $94.0M in FY2024, and the 10-K warns payments may be ACCELERATED on a change of control, which is the sharp edge on any take-private story.
Key Metrics
Market Cap
$908M
SEC 10-K (FY2025, filed Feb 12 2026) + 10-Q/8-K (Q1 2026, filed May 11 2026) via yfinance
Enterprise Value
$2.30B
calculated
Revenue (TTM)
$1.25B
SEC filing
P/E (TTM)
7.2×
via financials
Forward P/E
2.8×
consensus
P/S (TTM)
0.7×
via financials
P/B
0.6×
via financials
EV/EBITDA
7.2×
calculated
PEG
–
calculated
Revenue Growth
2.9%
SEC filing
Gross Margin
83.8%
SEC filing
Operating Margin
18.6%
SEC filing
Net Margin
10.1%
SEC filing
Free Cash Flow
$373M
SEC filing
FCF Yield
41.1%
calculated
Debt / Equity
1.1×
SEC filing
Current Ratio
0.7×
SEC filing
Short Interest
17.9%
exchange
Institutional Own.
–
13F
Insider Own.
9.9%
proxy
Shares Out.
294.7M
SEC filing
Float
215.5M
exchange
Valuation
Price vs Fair Value
Bear$1.75
Base$5.00
Bull$9.50
Now $3.08
Bear Case
$1.75
Net revenue retention slips back toward the 85% low it printed at three quarter-ends in 2024, the 2026 revenue decline extends into 2027, and levered free cash flow compresses toward $250M as the rate reset raises cash interest. The market capitalizes a terminal-decline asset at roughly 2x that, so 2 x $250M is about $0.5B of equity, or $1.75 on 294.7M shares, and the 2029 maturity becomes a refinancing question. Near the published analyst low of $2.00. Probability ~30%.
Base Case
$5.00
Revenue lands inside the guided $1.185-1.205B, the ~$60M run-rate cost reduction sticks, and levered free cash flow holds near $340M after higher interest. The market pays about 4.5x that, so roughly $1.53B of equity. Spread over the 294.7M shares outstanding today that is about $5.20, and buybacks against the $1,140.1M remaining authorization pull it higher per share over time. Close to the $4.96 analyst mean and above the $4.00 median. Probability ~45%.
Bull Case
$9.50
The hybrid consumption model rolling out from Q3 2026 lifts net revenue retention back toward 100%, helped by Copilot cohorts already renewing mid-single digits better than legacy seats, revenue restabilizes, and the market re-rates to a still-modest 8x on about $350M of levered free cash flow. That is $2.8B of equity, roughly $9.50 on 294.7M shares. Well below the $15.00 published analyst high. Probability ~25%.
DCF Summary
DCF awaiting Phase 2+
Discounted cash-flow model is built once research reaches the deep-research stage.
Historical Multiples
| Year | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY22 | 192.5× | 11.1× | 39.6× |
| FY23 | 66.3× | 5.7× | 15.5× |
| FY24 | 123.5× | 3.0× | 31.0× |
| FY25 | 25.2× | 2.5× | 13.9× |
| TTM · | 7.2× | 0.7× | 7.2× |
Current multiple highlighted vs trailing history.
Peer Comparison
| Ticker | Mkt Cap | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA | Rev Growth | Gross Mgn | Net Mgn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GTM | $0.91B | 7.2× | 0.7× | 7.2× | +2.9% | 83.8% | 10.1% |
| TTGT | $0.27B | – | 0.6× | 4.7× | +2.1% | 59.6% | -113.7% |
| SMWB | $0.60B | – | 2.1× | – | +10.1% | 79.6% | -10.4% |
| DV | $1.68B | 32.2× | 2.2× | 12.0× | +9.6% | 82.2% | 7.2% |
| HUBS | $11.4B | 107.7× | 3.5× | 113.4× | +23.4% | 83.7% | 3.0% |
| CRM | $142B | 19.0× | 3.3× | 13.4× | +13.3% | 77.6% | 18.7% |
Financials
| Line Item | FY2024 | FY2025 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue | $1,214.3M | $1,249.5M | +2.9% |
| Cost of Revenue | $189.8M | $199.6M | +5.2% |
| Gross Profit Gross margin 84% in both years per the 10-K; 83.8% on a trailing-twelve-month basis | $1,024.5M | $1,049.9M | +2.5% |
| Research & Development | $196.1M | $182.0M | -7.2% |
| Operating Income FY24 carried $30.1M of right-of-publicity settlement charges plus lease impairments. FY25 margin of 18.1% is still below FY2023's 20.9%, so this is a rebound off a depressed base, not a return to prior peak. | $97.4M | $225.7M | +131.7% |
| Interest Expense, net Net of interest income. Cash interest paid was $44.0M (FY24) and $45.8M (FY25). | $39.3M | $42.6M | +8.4% |
| Pretax Income | $31.3M | $194.3M | +520.8% |
| Tax Provision No YoY percentage shown: FY24's $2.2M reflected one-off benefits, so a growth rate off that base is arithmetic noise rather than a trend. | $2.2M | $70.1M | – |
| Net Income (GAAP) | $29.1M | $124.2M | +326.8% |
| EBITDA | $156.3M | $325.7M | +108.4% |
| Diluted Average Shares Per 10-K Note 11. Buyback-driven; 294.7M outstanding today. | 362.2M | 324.0M | -10.5% |
| Item | FY2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $175.9M | $171.2M at Mar 31 2026 |
| Total Current Assets | $454.0M | Current ratio 0.72 at Dec 31 2025 (0.69 at Mar 31 2026) |
| Total Current Liabilities | $632.9M | Of which $474.6M is unearned revenue, an obligation to deliver software rather than a claim on cash. Excluding it the ratio is about 2.9x. |
| Goodwill | $1,692.7M | Unchanged since FY2022; now exceeds equity |
| Total Assets | $6,439.5M | Includes $3,662.3M of deferred tax assets |
| Tax Receivable Agreements Liability | $2,731.9M | Non-current. The largest single liability, 55% of total liabilities, owed to pre-IPO owners as the deferred tax assets are realized. |
| Debt, principal outstanding | $1,332.2M | $100M revolver 2028 + $650M 3.875% notes 2029 + $582.2M term loan 2030. Maturity ladder $5.9M/2026, $5.9M/2027, $105.9M/2028, $655.9M/2029, $558.6M/2030. |
| Debt, balance-sheet carrying value | $1,324.0M | Principal less $8.2M of unamortized issuance costs |
| Operating Lease Liabilities | $245.2M | $6.0M current + $239.2M non-current. Carrying debt plus leases is the $1,569.2M that yfinance reports as Total Debt. |
| Total Liabilities | $4,930.8M | Against $6,439.5M of assets |
| Stockholders' Equity | $1,508.7M | Down from $2,271.8M in FY2022 on cumulative buybacks |
| Component | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $434.9M | $369.4M | $465.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | ($26.5M) | ($68.3M) | ($76.6M) |
| Free Cash Flow TTM $373.1M = 41% yield on a $908M market cap | $408.4M | $301.1M | $388.8M |
| Share Repurchases $1,376.8M over three years. The 10-K reports $230.6M available at Dec 31 2025; the board then added $1.0B in February 2026, taking cumulative authorizations to $2.6B with $1,140.1M available at Mar 31 2026. | ($400.1M) | ($565.6M) | ($411.1M) |
| Stock-Based Compensation Falling, and more than covered by buybacks | $167.6M | $138.0M | $116.2M |
Source: SEC 10-K (FY2025, filed Feb 12 2026) and the Q1 2026 results 8-K/10-Q (filed May 11 2026). Figures in USD, GAAP unless labelled; adjusted operating income and adjusted EPS are company-reported non-GAAP measures. Two reconciliations worth stating plainly. First, debt appears three ways and all three are shown: $1,332.2M of principal outstanding, $1,324.0M carried on the balance sheet after $8.2M of unamortized issuance costs, and $1,569.2M in the yfinance Total Debt field, which is the carrying value plus $245.2M of operating lease liabilities. Second, the $3,662.3M deferred tax asset is mirrored by a $2,731.9M tax receivable agreement liability owed to pre-IPO owners, so the balance sheet should not be read as carrying a $3.7B asset with nothing against it. Share counts here follow 10-K Note 11, which differs slightly from the yfinance field.
Catalysts
Aug '26
Earningshigh relevance
Q2 2026 results (est. Aug 5)
The first print after the guidance reset. Guided to $300-303M revenue and $0.26-0.28 adjusted EPS. What matters is net revenue retention against the 90% mark, the $100k+ customer count against 1,900, and whether the restructuring savings show up in margin. The consumption-pricing change cannot be judged here: management said the hybrid model rolls out from later in Q3, so the earliest read is the Q3 print around November 2026. ZoomInfo has landed at or above its own adjusted-EPS guide repeatedly, so a beat alone will not settle anything.
Aug '26
Legal
Securities class action lead-plaintiff deadline
August 24 2026 is the lead-plaintiff deadline in Tejada v. ZoomInfo Technologies Inc., No. 26-cv-05696 (W.D. Wash.), covering the November 3 2025 to May 11 2026 class period and alleging concealment of slowing seat-based demand, weakening upsells, and customers revising purchase decisions toward internal AI-driven tooling. Appointment of a lead plaintiff and consolidation would set the litigation timetable.
Q2-Q3 '26
Restructuringhigh relevance
2026 Restructuring Program charges land
Board-approved May 5 2026: roughly 600 roles, about 20% of Q1 headcount, with the Israel site closing by year-end. Pre-tax charges of $45-60M are expected mostly in Q2 and Q3 2026, substantially complete by year-end, against an expected ~$60M reduction in annual run-rate operating expense. Execution here is what protects the unchanged adjusted-EPS guide.
Live
Ownershiphigh relevance
HighSage 13D and the take-private option
HighSage Ventures LLC holds 14,479,835 shares (4.9%) and, via a cash-settled swap struck June 12 2026 at a $2.8088 reference price over 2.5M more shares, total economic exposure of 20,410,148 shares (6.9%). It files a 13D rather than a passive 13G, and its Item 4 reserves the right to acquire additional or potentially all securities and to push the board toward extraordinary transactions including a merger that could result in de-listing. Watch for further amendments. Against it, Sachem Head exited entirely in Q1 2026.
2026-27
Capital Return
Buyback pace against the $2.6B authorization
Q1 2026 alone retired 13.1M shares at an average $6.91. Every dollar spent below the prior average is materially more accretive at $3.08. FY2026 guidance assumes 315M weighted-average shares against 294.7M outstanding today, so the pace of retirement is directly observable each quarter.
H2 '26
Accounting
Goodwill impairment test
Goodwill of $1,692.7M exceeds stockholders' equity of $1,508.7M, and market capitalization of $908M is far below carrying value after a roughly 75% share-price decline. That combination is the classic trigger for an interim impairment assessment. Any charge would be non-cash and would not affect the free-cash-flow thesis, but it would be large and would dominate a reported quarter.
2028-30
Capital Structure
Debt maturity ladder
The 10-K schedules contractual principal payments of $5.9M in 2026, $5.9M in 2027, $105.9M in 2028, $655.9M in 2029 and $558.6M in 2030, totalling $1,332.2M. Near-term amortization is trivial, just the term loan's 0.25% quarterly step. The $100M drawn revolver matures February 28 2028, $650M of 3.875% senior notes on February 1 2029 and the term loan on February 28 2030. Refinancing a declining-revenue business at 2029 rates is the structural bear anchor.
Aug '26
Regulatoryhigh relevance
California Delete Act enforcement begins
From August 1 2026 registered data brokers must access California's Delete Request and Opt-out Platform at least once every 45 days, process verified deletion requests within 45 days, treat unverified requests as opt-outs from sale or sharing, direct service providers to delete, and keep deleting newly collected data on the same 45-day cycle. A single consumer request propagates to all registered brokers at once. ZoomInfo's product is a licensed database of business contacts, so recurring bulk deletion is a direct operating cost and a slow leak in the asset itself. The magnitude depends on California request volume, which nobody can yet observe. Authority is the Delete Act, Cal. Civ. Code section 1798.99.86, administered by the California Privacy Protection Agency.
Risks
| Risk | Category | Severity | Probability | Impact on Thesis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenue retention of 90% means the installed customer base shrinks every year before any new business, and FY2026 revenue is guided to decline to $1.185-1.205B from $1,249.5M in FY2025. | Business Model | High | Certain | A sub-100% retention rate turns growth into a treadmill: new logos must first replace lost ACV. If retention does not recover, revenue and eventually free cash flow compound downward, which is precisely what the bear scenario capitalizes. |
| Generative AI may commoditize licensed B2B contact data, with customers building internally or moving to AI-native tools; the pivot to consumption-based pricing is readable as a defensive response. | Disruption | High | Medium | It is the main reason the stock trades at 2.8x guided adjusted earnings, though not the only erosion channel, since regulated bulk deletion works on the same asset from the supply side. If the thesis is right, no multiple is low enough. If it is wrong, the current price capitalizes a durable cash stream at a fraction of its worth. The evidence is genuinely unresolved today. |
| Goodwill of $1,692.7M exceeds stockholders' equity of $1,508.7M while market capitalization ($908M) sits far below carrying value. | Accounting | Medium | High | An impairment test is effectively triggered. A charge would be non-cash and would not touch free cash flow or debt covenants, but it would be large relative to equity and would make a reported quarter look far worse than the cash economics. |
| Two securities class actions, three derivative suits and four non-securities matters. The 2024 action, No. 3:24-cv-05739-TMC (W.D. Wash.), survived dismissal on October 28 2025 and is in class-certification briefing; the 2026 Tejada action, No. 3:26-cv-05696, was filed June 25 2026 with an August 24 2026 lead-plaintiff deadline. | Legal | High | High | The older case is past the stage where most securities suits die, so this is no longer untested exposure. Neither case has a disclosed reserve, but ZoomInfo has a price precedent: it incurred and fully paid $30.1M in FY2024 to settle right-of-publicity class actions, a charge large enough to be one reason FY2024 operating income fell to $97.4M. Two securities actions arising from two separate guidance shocks is itself a governance signal. |
| California's Delete Act obliges registered data brokers to process bulk consumer deletion requests through the state's centralized platform on a 45-day cycle from August 1 2026, and ZoomInfo's core asset is a licensed database of personal business contact records. | Regulatory | Medium | High | This is a recurring compliance cost and a structural erosion mechanism rather than a one-off fine, because deleted records must stay deleted as new data is collected. Exposure scales with California request volume, which is not yet observable. ZoomInfo has already litigated and paid on right-of-publicity claims over profile data, incurring $30.1M of settlement charges in FY2024. |
| Funded debt of $1,332.2M against $175.9M of cash, a current ratio of 0.69, and 17.9% of the float sold short. | Capital Structure | Medium | Medium | No maturity before February 2028 and free cash flow comfortably covers interest, so this is a refinancing risk rather than a solvency risk. But leverage plus declining revenue plus a heavily shorted float is what makes the equity move violently on each guidance revision. |
Technical Snapshot
52-Week Range
$2.54$3.08$12.51
RSI (14)
51
neutral
50-Day MA
$3.09
-0.3%below
200-Day MA
$6.94
-55.6%below
Avg Vol (30d)
11.8M
-39%vs average
Support Levels
$2.54
Resistance Levels
$6.47$6.87$10.40
Price path reconstructed from the 52-week range, current price, and 50/200-day moving averages. Connect a live market-data feed for production.
Ownership & Insider Activity
Top Institutional Holders via 13F filings
| Institution | Shares | % Held | Chg QoQ | Filing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vanguard Group Inc. | 33.29M | 11.2% | – | |
| Henry L. Schuck (Founder, CEO) | 27.51M | 9.2% | – | |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 27.18M | 9.1% | – | |
| FMR LLC (Fidelity) | 23.45M | 7.9% | – | |
| RPD Fund Management LLC | 21.61M | 7.2% | – | |
| Kirk Brown | 20.99M | 7.0% | – | |
| HighSage Ventures LLC | 20.41M | 6.8% | – | |
| Glenview Capital Management, LLC | 17.58M | 5.9% | – | |
| Dimensional Fund Advisors LP | 13.54M | 4.6% | – |
Insider Activity
The table above follows ZoomInfo's own 2026 proxy, which reports beneficial ownership as of March 15 2026 against 298,249,955 shares outstanding, because that is one internally consistent dated source rather than a blend of feeds. Read it with two caveats the proxy itself supplies. The Vanguard row rests on a Schedule 13G/A from February 13 2024, and Vanguard Group Inc. filed a 13G/A on March 27 2026 reporting zero shares after moving its positions into two affiliated managers, so the 11.2% is a stale label rather than a current holding by that entity. Several holders' own later filings also differ from the proxy, and those are noted per row. All directors and executive officers as a group, 13 people, held 29,490,464 shares or 9.9% at March 15 2026. Note that the yfinance insider field reads 12.7% and the yfinance institutional field reads 105%, which is impossible, so neither is published here. The register has one genuinely active position. HighSage Ventures LLC of Boston files a Schedule 13D, not a passive 13G, and its June 16 2026 amendment reports 14,479,835 shares, 4.9% of the class, plus a cash-settled total return swap entered on June 12 2026 over 2,500,000 more shares at a reference price of $2.8088 with a five-year maturity, taking total economic exposure to 20,410,148 shares or 6.9%. HighSage added that exposure a month after the crash, near the lows. Its stated Item 4 purpose reserves the right to acquire additional or potentially all securities of the issuer and to encourage the board to explore extraordinary transactions including a merger or reorganization that could result in de-listing or de-registration, which is take-private language in a filing rather than a rumour. Cutting the other way, Sachem Head Capital Management held 14,795,000 shares worth $150.5M at December 31 2025 and reported none at March 31 2026, so that activist exited in full before the guidance cut. Open-market Form 4 activity since the collapse is thin but constructive at board level: director Domenic Maida bought 27,500 shares at $3.60 on May 26 2026, while Chief Revenue Officer James Roth and General Counsel Ashley McGrane sold 20,800 and 2,500 shares at $2.98 on July 2 2026. Widen the window and the executive selling is larger and earlier: Roth sold 45,065 shares at $6.656 on February 18 2026 and 35,723 at $5.8726 on April 2 2026, and McGrane sold 2,045 at $6.01 on March 13 2026 and 6,959 at $5.8737 on April 2 2026, all before the May collapse. Routine RSU vests and tax-withholding dispositions are excluded because they carry no directional signal. The yfinance institutional-ownership field reads 105% for this ticker, which is impossible, so it isn't published. Short interest is 17.9% of a 215.5M-share float.
| Name | Title | Action | Shares | Price | Date | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roth James M | Chief Revenue Officer | Sell | 20.8K | $2.98 | 2026-07-02 | $61.9K |
| Mcgrane Ashley | General Counsel and Corp Sec | Sell | 2.5K | $2.98 | 2026-07-02 | $7.3K |
| Roth James M | Chief Revenue Officer | Sell | 200 | $3.55 | 2026-06-02 | $710 |
| Mcgrane Ashley | General Counsel and Corp Sec | Sell | 34 | $3.55 | 2026-06-02 | $121 |
| Maida Domenic | Director | Buy | 27.5K | $3.60 | 2026-05-26 | $99K |
Peer Comparison
| Ticker | Mkt Cap | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA | Rev Growth | Gross Mgn | Net Mgn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GTM | $0.91B | 7.2× | 0.7× | 7.2× | +2.9% | 83.8% | 10.1% |
| TTGT | $0.27B | – | 0.6× | 4.7× | +2.1% | 59.6% | -113.7% |
| SMWB | $0.60B | – | 2.1× | – | +10.1% | 79.6% | -10.4% |
| DV | $1.68B | 32.2× | 2.2× | 12.0× | +9.6% | 82.2% | 7.2% |
| HUBS | $11.4B | 107.7× | 3.5× | 113.4× | +23.4% | 83.7% | 3.0% |
| CRM | $142B | 19.0× | 3.3× | 13.4× | +13.3% | 77.6% | 18.7% |
Recognizable sector comparables. Multiples are trailing-twelve-month figures from market and exchange data; lowest multiple in each column highlighted. Loss-making peers show no P/E.
Research Notes
2026-07-28Internal (40-agent deep research + yfinance ground truth)
DEEP INTEL: GTM, a 41% free-cash-flow yield priced for terminal decline
Built from a 20-dimension research workflow with adversarial verification, every financial figure locked to a yfinance harvest and every operational claim traced to an SEC filing. The setup: $908M market cap, $373.1M trailing free cash flow, 83.8% gross margin, 7.2x trailing and 2.8x company-guided forward earnings, against net revenue retention of 90%, guided 2026 revenue decline, a 20% workforce cut and an AI-disruption narrative. Conviction 3/5. Cash flow against terminal decline, not a compounder.
2026-05-11ZoomInfo Q1 2026 results (8-K Ex-99.1)
The day the multiple broke: a beat, then a $62M guidance cut
ZoomInfo reported Q1 2026 revenue of $310.2M, up 1.5% year over year, GAAP operating income of $57.9M (19% margin), adjusted operating income of $109.7M (35% margin), operating cash flow of $114.7M and unlevered free cash flow of $119.7M. Adjusted diluted EPS of $0.28 came in above the $0.25-0.27 the company guided on February 9 2026. Then the outlook: FY2026 revenue guidance cut from $1.247-1.267B to $1.185-1.205B and adjusted operating income from $456-466M to $437-447M. Adjusted EPS guidance was left unchanged at $1.10-1.12 and unlevered free cash flow trimmed to $400-420M. The stock closed at $6.04 on May 11 and $4.06 on May 12, a 33% single-day decline on 42.4M shares.
2026-05-05ZoomInfo 8-K, Item 2.05
2026 Restructuring Program: 600 roles, 20% of headcount, Israel site closed
The board approved the 2026 Restructuring Program on May 5 2026 to reduce operating costs and drive operating leverage. It entails a global reduction in force of approximately 600 employees, about 20% of ending first-quarter headcount, with roughly one-quarter of impacted roles reallocated to or offset by hiring in other locations. Expected pre-tax charges are $45-60M, mostly cash, mostly recognized in Q2 and Q3 2026, and substantially complete by year-end, against an expected reduction in annual run-rate operating expenses of approximately $60M. In a note to employees on May 11 2026, six days after the board approved the program, CEO Henry Schuck confirmed the Israel site will close with operations transferred to the US, Canada, Ireland and India, and that approximately 340 people in the US, India and UK were notified their roles were eliminated. He framed it as simplifying operations, accelerating the move upmarket, reducing resources allocated downmarket, and responding to an industry move toward consumption-based pricing.
2026-02-12ZoomInfo FY2025 10-K + quarterly disclosures
Net revenue retention, the number the whole argument turns on
ZoomInfo computes net revenue retention as the opening cohort's annual contract value at period end divided by the same cohort's ACV at period start. The full disclosed sequence is 85% at March, June and September 2024, 87% at December 2024, 87% at March 2025, 89% at June 2025, then 90% at September 2025, December 2025 and March 2026. Two readings follow, and the page owes both. Retention is the most improved operating metric the company discloses, up five points off the 85% low. It is also still below 100%, so the installed base contracts organically and new business has to fill that hole before any growth shows. On the customer side the 10-K reports 1,921, 1,867 and 1,820 customers at $100,000 or more of ACV for December 2025, 2024 and 2023, a cohort that is over 50% of total company ACV but still below its 1,926 peak in December 2022. At March 2026 the count was 1,900, down 21 sequentially and up 32 year over year, with upmarket at 75% of ACV growing 5%. Since upmarket rose from 71% to 75% of the book while total ACV was roughly flat, the non-upmarket remainder shrank at a double-digit rate.
2026-02-12ZoomInfo FY2025 10-K
The buyback, $2.6B authorized and 27% of the shares already retired
The board authorized a share repurchase program in March 2023, added $500.0M in February 2025 to reach $1.6B, then added a further $1.0B in February 2026, bringing cumulative authorizations to $2.6B as of March 31 2026 with $1,140.1M still available and authorized. Actual repurchases were $400.1M in FY2023, $565.6M in FY2024 and $411.1M in FY2025, $1,376.8M in three years, plus $90.5M in Q1 2026 for 13.1M shares at an average $6.91. Ordinary shares outstanding fell from 404.1M (FY2022) to 384.8M, 342.0M and 307.3M at each subsequent year end, and stand at 294.7M today, a 27% reduction. Stock-based compensation fell over the same period from $192.3M to $116.2M, so the buyback is genuine net shrinkage rather than dilution offset.
2026-02-12ZoomInfo FY2025 10-K (debt footnotes)
Debt stack: nothing due before February 2028
As of December 31 2025 total outstanding funded indebtedness was $1,332.2M: $100.0M drawn under the first-lien revolving credit facility maturing February 28 2028 (with $150.0M of remaining availability), $650.0M of 3.875% senior notes maturing February 1 2029 with semi-annual interest, and a $582.2M first-lien term loan amortizing at 0.25% of the original principal per quarter with the balance due February 28 2030. Interest expense, net was $42.6M in FY2025, but that figure is already stale: a $500M swap fixed at 0.370% matured January 30 2026 and was replaced with $425M at 3.280%, pushing Q1 2026 net interest expense to $13.5M against $9.8M a year earlier, an annualised run rate near $54M. Just over half the stack floats with SOFR. The yfinance Total Debt field of $1,569.2M is the $1,324.0M carrying value plus $245.2M of operating lease liabilities.
2026-05-26SEC Form 4 filings
Insider activity after the collapse: one board buy, small executive sells
Open-market Form 4 activity since the May 2026 guidance cut is limited but net constructive at board level. Director Domenic Maida purchased 27,500 shares at $3.60 on May 26 2026, roughly $99,000, two weeks after the stock fell 33%. Against that, Chief Revenue Officer James Roth sold 20,800 shares at $2.98 and General Counsel Ashley McGrane sold 2,500 shares at $2.98 on July 2 2026, with two further token sales at $3.55 on June 2 2026. Routine RSU vests, grants and tax-withholding dispositions are excluded from this tally because they carry no directional signal. Insiders hold about 12.7% of shares outstanding.
2026-06-01ZoomInfo product releases + earnings calls
What the company is actually shipping against the AI threat
The bear case deserves the counter-evidence. ZoomInfo disclosed Copilot ACV above $150M on its Q4 2024 call, launched GTM Studio in May 2025 alongside the ticker change, and on June 1 2026 made GTM.AI generally available, positioning it as a headless context layer reachable over an API and the Model Context Protocol so the data can be consumed directly inside Claude, ChatGPT, Copilot and Agentforce rather than through a ZoomInfo seat. On July 10 2026 it published GTM Bench, a versioned benchmark for scoring language models and agents on go-to-market tasks. On the Q1 2026 call management said roughly a third of ACV is already untethered from seats and that from Q3 2026 customers can convert historical per-seat spend into consumption. Whether this is a real pivot or a defensive repackaging is the open question, but the page should not pretend the company is standing still.
2026-02-12ZoomInfo FY2025 10-K, Notes 2 and 14
Revenue mix and contract structure
ZoomInfo runs as a single operating segment, so there is no product-line revenue breakdown. The 10-K gives two disaggregations. By service offering, FY2025 revenue was $1,229.0M subscription, $15.0M usage-based and $5.5M other, so subscriptions are roughly 98% of the total. Usage-based revenue is mostly email verification and online-advertising facilitation billed per unit. By geography it was $1,103.7M in the United States and $145.8M rest of world, about 12% international. Subscriptions are priced on functionality, users and records under management rather than a flat per-seat rate, contracts typically run one to three years and are non-cancelable, and about 53% of contracts by annualized value are multi-year. That contract structure is why revenue lags retention: a 90% net revenue retention rate shows up in reported revenue slowly, over renewal cycles.
2026-06-16SEC Schedule 13D/A and Form 13F-HR
Two activists, moving in opposite directions
One activist left and another leaned in, which is most of what the ownership picture says right now. Sachem Head Capital Management reported 14,795,000 shares worth $150,465,150 under sole discretion for the quarter ended December 31 2025. Its next 13F, for March 31 2026, lists 19 positions and ZoomInfo is not one of them, so it exited in full weeks before the May 11 guidance cut. Running the other way, HighSage Ventures LLC has filed a Schedule 13D since August 2025 and amended it on June 16 2026 to report 14,479,835 shares (4.9%) plus a cash-settled total return swap entered June 12 2026 over 2,500,000 shares at a $2.8088 reference price with a five-year maturity, lifting economic exposure to 20,410,148 shares (6.9%). That swap was struck roughly a month after the crash and close to the lows. HighSage's Item 4 reserves the right to buy additional or potentially all of the securities and to encourage the board toward extraordinary transactions including a merger or reorganization that could de-list the company. A 13D is a statement of reserved rights, not a bid, and no proposal has been disclosed. But it is the only documented take-private optionality on this name, and it sits on a company whose remaining buyback authorization alone exceeds its market cap.
2026-06-25W.D. Wash. dockets + ZoomInfo 10-K/10-Q Note 9
The litigation stack, and why the older case matters more
ZoomInfo faces two securities class actions in the Western District of Washington, and the one the headlines missed is the advanced one. State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio and Ohio Public Employees Retirement System v. ZoomInfo, No. 3:24-cv-05739-TMC, was filed September 4 2024 over the 2024 guidance collapse. On October 28 2025 the court denied dismissal as to ZoomInfo, Schuck, Hyzer and Hays, while dismissing TA Associates, Carlyle and DO Holdings. Class-certification briefing opened June 26 2026, with document production due to be substantially complete October 21 2026. Surviving dismissal is the stage at which most securities suits die, so this exposure is no longer theoretical. The newer action, Tejada v. ZoomInfo, No. 3:26-cv-05696, was filed June 25 2026 covering November 3 2025 to May 11 2026 and alleging concealment of slowing seat-based demand and weakening upsells. Its lead-plaintiff deadline is August 24 2026, and it post-dates every periodic report filed so far, so the absence of a reserve reflects timing rather than a company judgment. Three derivative actions are also pending, two consolidated in W.D. Wash. and one filed March 25 2026 in the Delaware Court of Chancery, alongside privacy matters including a Washington Personal Rights Act case. An earlier Ninth Circuit panel in Martinez v. ZoomInfo affirmed denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in September 2023, but that opinion was vacated when rehearing en banc was granted in January 2024 and the case settled that March, so it is not standing authority. For scale on what these cost, ZoomInfo incurred and fully paid $30.1M in FY2024 settling earlier right-of-publicity class actions.
2026-07-28yfinance (computed, USD)
The de-rating, measured
Trailing price-to-sales has fallen from 11.08x at the end of FY2022 to 5.74x, 2.96x, 2.50x and now 0.72x. EV/EBITDA has gone 39.6x, 15.5x, 31.0x, 13.9x and now 7.2x. The share price closed FY2025 at $10.17 and trades at $3.08, having touched $2.54, against a 52-week high of $12.51, a 75% drawdown inside twelve months. The 200-day moving average sits at $6.94, more than double the current price. What did not fall proportionally is the cash: free cash flow was $388.1M, $408.4M, $301.1M and $388.8M across FY2022-FY2025 and $373.1M on a trailing basis, so the entire move is multiple compression rather than cash-flow collapse. Eighteen analysts publish a mean target of $4.96, a median of $4.00, a low of $2.00 and a high of $15.00.
ZoomInfo valuation questions
Is ZoomInfo (GTM) stock undervalued?
Against the fair value estimate shown on this page, ZoomInfo trades below: $3.08 today versus a $5.00 estimate, about +62%. The methodology and per-scenario sources are set out in the Valuation section. Treat it as research, not advice, and do your own homework.
What is ZoomInfo's fair value?
The fair value estimate shown for GTM is $5.00. Its valuation scenarios span bear $1.75, base $5.00, bull $9.50. See the Valuation section for the basis of each.
What is ZoomInfo's forward P/E ratio?
ZoomInfo (GTM) trades at a forward P/E of 2.8×, and 0.7× trailing sales.
What is ZoomInfo's market cap?
ZoomInfo (GTM) has a market capitalization (its market value, often searched as "net worth") of $908M, and an enterprise value of $2.30B.
What is the bull and bear case for GTM?
Valuation scenarios: bull $9.50, base $5.00, bear $1.75. Each reflects a distinct set of assumptions; the drivers and sources are detailed in the Valuation section above.