PagSeguro Digital

Total revenue and income went from R$18,809,632 thousand in FY2024 to R$20,410,512 thousand in FY2025, an increase of R$1,600,880 thousand and 8.5%. Two components of that total move in opposite directions. Financial income rose from R$9,150,427 thousand to R$11,584,606 thousand, up R$2,434,179 thousand and 26.6%. Transaction activities and other services fell from R$9,183,282 thousand to R$8,158,654 thousand, down R$1,024,628 thousand and 11.2%. The rise in the first is 152% of the rise in the total, and the second is the only component that declined. The consequence is a mix shift of more than eight points in a single year: financial income was 48.6% of revenue in FY2024 and 56.8% in FY2025. Net income across that shift was R$2,116,368 thousand then R$2,118,362 thousand, a change of R$1,994 thousand, or 0.09%. The company is not growing 8.5%. A lending and treasury book is growing 26.6% and a merchant acquiring business is shrinking 11.2%, and the two happen to net to a bottom line that has not moved in two years.

Two figures that appear on almost every other page on this site are absent here, and the reason is the same for both. The FY2025 Form 20-F does not report EBITDA. Not as a headline, not in a reconciliation, not in a segment note. The word appears exactly once in the document, inside a citation of a magazine award, and no financial measure by that name is disclosed anywhere. Any EV/EBITDA multiple for this company therefore comes from outside the filings, including the 7.53 in this page's own metrics block and the 5.8 in its own peer table, which disagreed with each other. Enterprise value fails for a different reason. It is defined as market capitalisation plus debt less cash, and it works when the debt is a claim ahead of the equity on an operating business. This is a bank. At 30 June 2026 it held R$75,697,476 thousand of assets against R$15,015,865 thousand of equity, leaving R$60,681,611 thousand of liabilities, of which R$31,863,969 thousand are banking issuances. Deposits and funding instruments are the raw material a bank buys and lends out, not a lien on an operating asset. Adding them to a US$2,700.2M market capitalisation gives US$13,728.4M, 5.08 times the market value of the company, and describes nothing anyone could buy. So the field is null and the multiple is empty, which is the honest answer rather than the missing one.

This company files in Brazilian reais and this site publishes in US dollars, so every dollar figure here is a conversion and a reader is owed the rate and its limits. The rate is R$5.5024 to US$1.00. It is not chosen here; it is the Central Bank commercial selling rate for 31 December 2025 that the company states in its own 20-F and uses for that filing's convenience translations. Two simplifications follow. A period-end rate applied to a year of revenue and earnings prices twelve months of trading at one day's exchange rate, and the real moved during those twelve months. The same rate applied to the 30 June 2026 balance sheet is six months out of date. Both are accepted here in exchange for a single consistent basis across the page, so that the price to earnings, price to sales and price to book on this page can be compared with one another. They should not be compared with a figure translated at some other rate. The previous version of this page is the reason for saying this rather than assuming it: its published revenue implied a rate near R$5.64 while its published net income implied a rate near R$9.47, a 68% inconsistency inside one metrics block, and it produced a net margin of 22.0% against a filed figure of 10.4%.

This entry was rebuilt from two filings and almost nothing from the previous version survived. The valuation figures went first. A price to earnings ratio of 11.7 in the metrics block and 9.5 in the peer table, an EV/EBITDA of 7.53 and 5.8 in the same two places, revenue growth of 15.6 and 12, a net margin of 22.0, a forward price to earnings of 6.5, a PEG of 0.6, a free cash flow of US$150M and a yield of 5.61%, a debt to equity of 0.38, a current ratio of 1.4, short interest of 15.0%, institutional ownership of 62.0% and insider ownership of 22.0% are all gone, either recomputed or emptied. The balance sheet went next: R$28.5bn of assets, R$6.5bn of equity, R$4.1bn of cash, R$14.8bn of client deposits, R$2.5bn of debt and a book value of R$18.57 a share bore no relation to the filings, which show R$74.4bn of assets, R$14.6bn of equity and R$1.86bn of cash at 31 December 2025. An enterprise value of US$2,166.8M rested on a net cash figure of US$490M that no filing supports, and both are withdrawn. Four narrative claims are deleted outright because they appear nowhere in the verified figures: a take rate stable at about 4.0% across five quarters, a 90 day non performing loan rate of 3.0%, provision coverage of 210%, and a US$300M buyback authorisation with about US$176M remaining. The five year multiple history was withdrawn to an empty state because it restated the same unsupported earnings across five rows. The quarterly income table for the first quarter of 2025 was deleted; it did not reconcile to the 6-K on a single line. So was the cash flow forensic that produced a core free cash flow of R$188M a quarter, because no cash flow statement was verified in this pass. Two notes are also withdrawn. One dated 25 May 2026 stated that the first quarter 2025 income statement and balance sheet had been cross validated against the 6-K, and named a take rate of 3.99%, a 90 day non performing loan rate of 3.0%, provision coverage of 210% and net cash of R$8.1bn. That validation did not happen and none of those four figures is in the filings. One dated 3 June 2026 recorded a completed cash flow forensic that rests on the deleted cash flow table. What remains is an income statement, a balance sheet, a share count and the arithmetic on them.