Qifu Technology (QFIN) valuation at a glance
Qifu Technology (QFIN) trades below the fair value estimate shown here. At $14.75 versus a $18.00 estimate, that is a 22% upside.
- Price
- $14.75
- Fair value estimate
- $18.00
- Upside
- +22%
- Forward P/E
- 3.1×
- Market cap
- $1.80B
- P/S (TTM)
- 0.7×
CompaniesQFIN
Overview
QFIN
Qifu Technology
Financial ServicesCredit-TechChina ADRCapital ReturnNet CashRegulatory Overhang
$14.75+1.7%
Market Cap
$1.80B
yfinance (FY2025) + Qifu earnings releases and SEC 20-F
P/E (TTM)
2.4×
via financials
Rev Growth YoY
12.0%
+12%SEC filing
Gross Margin
[awaiting: credit platform, not meaningful]
SEC filing
FCF Yield
[awaiting: 83% headline overstates, see note]
calculated
Upside to FV
+22.0%
vs fair value
Conviction
2/5Qifu earns a 31% net margin and $883M on RMB 19.2B (about $2.75B) of revenue, yet trades at 2.4x earnings with net cash and a 10.6% dividend. That looks like the cheapest profitable lender anywhere. But the discount is mostly earned. China made the 24% consumer-loan rate cap a hard legal ceiling in October 2025 and is tightening it toward about 12% by 2027, Qifu's loan balance fell from RMB 126B to about RMB 114B during regulatory review, and it guided Q2 2026 net income down 47% to 51%. So this is a bet that a shrinking, cash-gushing business hands back much of its market cap before regulation resets the earnings, not a clean compounder.
Research Depth
ScreeningDeep ResearchFull Model
Updated 20d ago
Quality Snowflake
Overall 67/100
Value3/3
Future1/3
Past1/1
Health2/2
Dividend0/1
Each axis scores the checks for which data is available (filled = pass, hollow = no data). Computed from the sourced metrics on this page, not a third-party rating.
Thesis
Qifu is, on the raw multiples, the cheapest profitable credit platform on the public market. It earned $883M on RMB 19.2B (roughly $2.75B) of FY2025 revenue at a 32% net margin, holds about $548M of net cash against a $1.80B market cap, pays a $1.54 per-ADS dividend for a 10.6% yield, and has retired roughly a quarter of its shares in three years, from 322.8M to 243.8M ordinary shares. At 2.4x trailing earnings and 3.1x forward, the tape prices a business in terminal decline. The honest problem is that the decline is now real, not imagined. China moved its 24% all-in consumer-loan rate cap from a judicial guideline to a hard legal ceiling in October 2025, regulators are pushing the all-in cost toward roughly 12% by 2027 which makes above-cap interest legally unenforceable, Qifu was summoned for review, and its outstanding loan balance fell from about RMB 126B at the end of 2025 to about RMB 114B by March 2026. Management then guided Q2 2026 net income down 47% to 51% year over year. So the deep-value screen is right that the stock is cheap and wrong that it is safe. The bull case is narrow and specific. Even a lender whose book contracts under rate caps can return most of its market value in dividends and buybacks over a few years, and Qifu is doing exactly that, paying out roughly what it earns while sitting on net cash. The bet is cash extraction outrunning regulatory attrition, and the reported 83% free-cash-flow yield overstates the real cushion because a big part of it is non-cash loan-loss provisions added back and loan-book funding that moves through the cash-flow statement like any lender's. Buy it for the payout and the buyback, not for growth, and size it for the regulatory risk that is actively repricing the earnings.
Bull Case
ValuationAbout 2.4x trailing earnings and 3.1x forward on a 31% net margin, with enterprise value near $1.15B against $883M of FY2025 net income. The market is pricing terminal decline into a still-profitable platform.
Net CashRoughly $548M of net cash, about 30% of the $1.80B market cap, plus $3.56B of book equity. The stock trades around half of book value.
Capital ReturnA $1.54 per-ADS dividend yields about 10.6%. FY2025 returned about $880M to shareholders (company-stated), a $203M dividend plus roughly $677M of equity buybacks, close to what it earned, while the share count fell about 24.5% in three years.
Capital-Light ShiftQifu keeps moving volume toward capital-light facilitation, where it earns technology and service fees from 167 financial-institution partners without holding the loan on its own book. Platform Services was about 27% of FY2025 revenue.
Re-rating OptionalityNear the 52-week low, about 63% below the $40 high, with 13 analysts at a $21.79 mean target. If the rate-cap outcome is milder than feared, a small narrowing of the China discount is a large move.
Bear Case
Rate CapChina made the 24% all-in consumer-loan cap a hard legal ceiling in October 2025 and is steering the all-in cost toward about 12% by 2027, four times the roughly 3% loan prime rate. Lower pricing compresses the take rate that funds the whole model.
Shrinking BookQifu's outstanding loan balance fell from about RMB 126B at end-2025 to about RMB 114B by March 2026 during regulatory review. Q2 2026 net income is guided down 47% to 51% year over year, so the earnings that make it look cheap are being reset now.
China-ADR and VIEQfin Holdings is a Cayman shell that controls its China business through VIEs, which produced about 95% of revenue. It is a US ADR exposed to HFCAA delisting mechanics and PRC oversight, a structural discount that does not clear quickly.
Cash-Flow QualityThe headline 83% free-cash-flow yield overstates real owner earnings. It is inflated by non-cash loan-loss provisions added back and by loan-book funding that runs through operating cash flow. Read it like a lender, where net income is the better anchor.
Credit CycleA weak China consumer means rising delinquencies at the same time regulation caps pricing, a squeeze on both sides. Management is prioritizing risk over growth, which shrinks volume further.
Key Metrics
Market Cap
$1.80B
yfinance (FY2025) + Qifu earnings releases and SEC 20-F
Enterprise Value
$1.15B
calculated
Revenue (TTM)
$2.23B
SEC filing
P/E (TTM)
2.4×
via financials
Forward P/E
3.1×
consensus
P/S (TTM)
0.7×
via financials
P/B
0.5×
via financials
EV/EBITDA
–
calculated
PEG
–
calculated
Revenue Growth
12.0%
SEC filing
Gross Margin
[awaiting: credit platform, not meaningful]
SEC filing
Operating Margin
[awaiting: credit platform]
SEC filing
Net Margin
32.0%
SEC filing
Free Cash Flow
[awaiting: lender cash flow, see note]
SEC filing
FCF Yield
[awaiting: 83% headline overstates, see note]
calculated
Debt / Equity
0.2×
SEC filing
Current Ratio
[awaiting: lender, not meaningful]
SEC filing
Short Interest
[awaiting: 13F/borrow data]
exchange
Institutional Own.
63.5%
13F
Insider Own.
3.4%
proxy
Shares Out.
122.0M
SEC filing
Float
118.0M
exchange
Valuation
Price vs Fair Value
Bear$9.00
Base$18.00
Bull$28.00
Now $14.75
Bear Case
$9.00
The rate cap ratchets to 12% fast, the loan book keeps shrinking, and earnings more than halve. The multiple stays low on a smaller base. Probability about 35%.
Base Case
$18.00
Earnings reset lower but stabilize, the dividend and buyback continue, and the stock re-rates modestly toward the analyst mean as the worst-case fear fades. Probability about 45%.
Bull Case
$28.00
The cap lands nearer 24% than 12%, volume stabilizes, and the China ADS discount narrows toward the $30 high target. Probability about 20%.
DCF Summary
Discount Rate
16%
Terminal Growth
0%
Projection
5y
Rev CAGR
-5%
Intrinsic / Share
$18.00
Margin of Safety
18%
Owner earnings anchored on net income, not the inflated headline free cash flow, with a high 16% discount rate for China-ADR and regulatory risk and an assumed multi-year revenue decline as the rate cap tightens. The net cash is added back. It deliberately assumes the business shrinks.
Historical Multiples
| Year | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY22 | – | – | – |
| FY23 | – | – | – |
| FY24 | 5.3× | – | – |
| FY25 | 2.5× | – | – |
| TTM · | 2.4× | 0.7× | – |
Current multiple highlighted vs trailing history.
Peer Comparison
| Ticker | Mkt Cap | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA | Rev Growth | Gross Mgn | Net Mgn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QFIN | $1.8B | 2.4× | 0.7× | – | +12.0% | – | 32.0% |
| LU | $5.5B | 12.0× | 1.4× | – | -5.0% | – | 8.0% |
| FINV | $2.6B | 4.5× | 1.1× | – | +10.0% | – | 22.0% |
| YRD | $0.4B | 2.8× | 0.4× | – | +5.0% | – | 15.0% |
Financials
| Line Item | FY2024 | FY2025 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue Company-stated USD; yfinance USD understates via FX | $2,412M | $2,746M | +12% |
| Net Interest / Financing Income | $1,013M | $1,304M | +28.7% |
| Credit-Driven Services On-balance-sheet, risk-bearing | n/a | ~73% of revenue | n/a |
| Platform Services Capital-light facilitation fees | n/a | ~27% of revenue | n/a |
| Net Income | $923M | $883M | -4.4% |
| Net Margin TTM net margin 31% | 44.6% | 37.3% | n/a |
| Diluted EPS / ADS | ~$6.50 | ~$7.24 | +11.4% |
| Item | Dec 2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Cash + ST Investments | $1,112M | $692M cash plus $420M short-term investments |
| Total Debt | $564M | Funding and consolidated trusts |
| Net Cash | $548M | About 30% of market cap |
| Loans / Receivables | on balance sheet | The capital-heavy book inside total assets |
| Total Assets | $8,395M | Includes the on-balance-sheet loan book |
| Stockholders' Equity | $3,555M | Stock trades near half of book |
Read this like a lender. Operating cash flow is inflated by about RMB 5.85B of non-cash loan-loss provisions added back, and the loan book funding runs through investing (about RMB 13B out) and financing. So the 83% headline free-cash-flow yield overstates true distributable cash. Net income is the better anchor.
| Component | FY2024 | FY2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1,377M | $1,634M | Inflated by non-cash provisions |
| Capital Expenditure | ($23M) | ($35M) | Asset-light on physical capex |
| Headline Free Cash Flow | $1,355M | $1,598M | Overstated, see note |
| Net Income (the anchor) | $923M | $883M | Better proxy for owner earnings |
| Dividends Paid | ($186M) | ($203M) | $1.54 per ADS, ~10.6% yield |
| Equity Buybacks | ($438M) | ($677M) | $450M 2025 plan (15.9M ADS) + $227M convert-linked |
Income figures from yfinance in USD (renminbi converted at about 0.147 CNY/USD). Qifu is a credit-tech lender, so gross and operating margin are not meaningful and free cash flow must be read like a lender's, not a software platform's. Segment split from Qifu's FY2025 earnings release.
Catalysts
Aug '26
Regulatoryhigh relevance
All-in cost disclosure deadline
Chinese regulators require lenders to disclose the all-in borrowing cost by around August 1 2026. It sharpens how close Qifu already is to the 24% ceiling and the path toward roughly 12%.
Aug '26
Earningshigh relevance
Q2 2026 results
Guided net income down 47% to 51% year over year, the first clean read on how hard the rate cap and loan-book contraction hit. Watch the take rate, delinquency and volume.
FY '26
Capital Return
Buyback and dividend continuation
The 2025 plan repurchased about 15.9M ADS for roughly $450M. Continued buyback plus the semi-annual dividend is the core of the return while the business shrinks.
by 2027
Regulatoryhigh relevance
Rate cap tightening toward 12%
Regulators are steering the all-in cost toward about four times the loan prime rate, roughly 12%, by 2027. Where it actually lands is the single biggest driver of the terminal earnings power.
Risks
| Risk | Category | Severity | Probability | Impact on Thesis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consumer-loan rate cap tightening from 24% toward about 12% | Regulatory | Critical | High | China made the 24% all-in cap a hard legal ceiling in October 2025 which makes above-cap interest unenforceable, and is pushing toward roughly 12% by 2027. Lower pricing directly compresses the take rate the whole model depends on. |
| Loan book contracting during regulatory review | Execution | High | High | The outstanding balance fell from about RMB 126B at end-2025 to about RMB 114B by March 2026, and Q2 2026 net income is guided down 47% to 51%. The earnings that make it look cheap are being reset now. |
| China-ADR delisting (HFCAA) and VIE structure | Regulatory | High | Medium | Qfin is a Cayman shell controlling PRC operations through VIEs that generate about 95% of revenue, listed as a US ADR exposed to delisting mechanics and PRC oversight. |
| Overstated headline free cash flow | Accounting | Medium | Certain | The 83% free-cash-flow yield is inflated by non-cash provisions and loan-book funding flows. Real distributable cash is closer to net income, so the true cushion is smaller than the screen implies. |
| Credit cycle in a weak China consumer | Market/Macro | High | Medium | Rising delinquencies at the same time regulation caps pricing is a two-sided squeeze. Management is prioritizing risk over growth, which shrinks volume further. |
Technical Snapshot
52-Week Range
$11.65$14.75$40.13
RSI (14)
46
neutral
50-Day MA
$14.35
+2.8%above
200-Day MA
$17.03
-13.4%below
Avg Vol (30d)
2.0M
0%vs average
Support Levels
$14.35$12.18$11.65
Resistance Levels
$17.03$18.18$22.00
Price path reconstructed from the 52-week range, current price, and 50/200-day moving averages. Connect a live market-data feed for production.
Ownership & Insider Activity
Top Institutional Holders via 13F filings
| Institution | Shares | % Held | Chg QoQ | Filing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aspex Management | ~5.2% | 5.2% | flat | 13F |
| FountainVest | ~4.9% | 4.9% | flat | 13F |
| BlackRock | ~4.8% | 4.8% | flat | 13F |
| KraneShares | ~4.1% | 4.1% | flat | 13F (China ADS ETF) |
Insider Activity
Institutions hold about 64%, led by China-focused funds (Aspex, FountainVest, BlackRock, KraneShares). Insiders are about 3.4%. The management signal here is capital allocation, an aggressive buyback that cut the share count about 24.5% in three years plus a rising dividend, rather than insider open-market buying.
| Name | Title | Action | Shares | Price | Date | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Management and 360 affiliates | Insiders | Hold | ~3.4% econ | n/a | yfinance | Buyback-driven |
Peer Comparison
| Ticker | Mkt Cap | P/E | P/S | EV/EBITDA | Rev Growth | Gross Mgn | Net Mgn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QFIN | $1.8B | 2.4× | 0.7× | – | +12.0% | – | 32.0% |
| LU | $5.5B | 12.0× | 1.4× | – | -5.0% | – | 8.0% |
| FINV | $2.6B | 4.5× | 1.1× | – | +10.0% | – | 22.0% |
| YRD | $0.4B | 2.8× | 0.4× | – | +5.0% | – | 15.0% |
Recognizable sector comparables. Multiples are trailing-twelve-month figures from market and exchange data; lowest multiple in each column highlighted. Loss-making peers show no P/E.
Research Notes
2026-07-09Internal (16-agent deep workflow + forensic)
Why this looks too cheap, and mostly is not
The deep-value screen flags QFIN hard: 2.4x earnings, 31% net margin, net cash, a 10.6% dividend and a 24.5% three-year share-count cut. The forensic sprint found the cheapness is largely earned, not a free lunch. China turned its 24% all-in consumer-loan rate cap into a hard legal ceiling in October 2025 and is steering it toward about 12% by 2027 which makes above-cap interest unenforceable. Qifu was summoned for review and its loan balance fell from about RMB 126B at end-2025 to about RMB 114B by March 2026. Management guided Q2 2026 net income down 47% to 51%. So the earnings that make the multiple look absurd are being reset. Conviction is 2 of 5, a watch-and-collect-the-dividend name, not a table-pounder.
2026-07-09yfinance (computed, USD)
The valuation, and the de-rating that created it
At $14.75 the market cap is $1.80B against $883M of FY2025 net income, a 2.4x P/E, with about $548M of net cash. The stock fell from a $40 high, and the year-end P/E history tells the story: 5.3x at end-2024 ($34.61) to 2.5x at end-2025 ($18.18) to 2.4x now, while earnings per ADS actually rose from about $6.50 to $7.24. Price cut in half, earnings up. That gap is the regulatory fear pricing in an earnings reset the screen does not yet show.
2026-07-09Forensic (FY2025 cash-flow statement)
The 83% free-cash-flow yield is a lender's mirage
Operating cash flow was about RMB 11.1B in FY2025, but it is inflated by roughly RMB 5.85B of non-cash provisions added back (loan-loss and contingent-liability provisions), and the loan book consumed about RMB 13B in investing while financing added about RMB 2.8B. So the headline free cash flow of about $1.6B, an 83% yield, is not clean owner earnings. Net income of about $883M is the honest anchor, and management pays out roughly that much, near or above 100% of earnings, funded partly by the net-cash cushion.
2026-07-09Qifu FY2025 20-F
Structure and business model
Qifu runs a credit-tech platform matching Chinese consumer and small-business borrowers with 167 financial-institution partners. In capital-light facilitation the partner funds and holds the loan while Qifu earns a service fee off balance sheet. In capital-heavy, Qifu takes the credit risk through consolidated micro-lending and trusts. FY2025 revenue was about 73% credit-driven and 27% platform services. It is a Cayman holding company controlling PRC operations through VIEs, and each ADS equals two Class A ordinary shares.
Qifu Technology valuation questions
Is Qifu Technology (QFIN) stock undervalued?
Against the fair value estimate shown on this page, Qifu Technology trades below: $14.75 today versus a $18.00 estimate, about +22%. The methodology and per-scenario sources are set out in the Valuation section. Treat it as research, not advice, and do your own homework.
What is Qifu Technology's fair value?
The fair value estimate shown for QFIN is $18.00. Its valuation scenarios span bear $9.00, base $18.00, bull $28.00. See the Valuation section for the basis of each.
What is Qifu Technology's forward P/E ratio?
Qifu Technology (QFIN) trades at a forward P/E of 3.1×, and 0.7× trailing sales.
What is Qifu Technology's market cap?
Qifu Technology (QFIN) has a market capitalization (its market value, often searched as "net worth") of $1.80B, and an enterprise value of $1.15B.
What is the bull and bear case for QFIN?
Valuation scenarios: bull $28.00, base $18.00, bear $9.00. Each reflects a distinct set of assumptions; the drivers and sources are detailed in the Valuation section above.